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The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse by John
Searle — a still possible solution to an old problem?
Abstract. The purpose of this article is to consider an answer to the ques-
tion whether Searle’s idea of sentence in a literary text is still relevant.
Understanding literary utterances as specific speech acts, pretended illocu-
tions, is inherent in the process of considering the sentence in a literary
text in broader terms. Accordingly, it appears necessary to outline it. Ref-
erence to other ideas formulated both in the theory of literature as a speech
act [R. Ohmann, S. Levin] as well as in logic, ontology and the theory of
literature [J. Pelc, H. Markiewicz, R. Ingarden] will render it possible to
adequately place and assess Searle’s theory. Confronting Searle’s theory
with the order in a literary work (the relation between the text and the
literary work, the status of the presented world, the issue of reference and
fiction) will in turn render it possible to determine how empirically adequate
Searle’s theory is.
Keywords: fictional discourse, ontology, reference, objects created in a work
of fiction, pretended illocution, cognitive function, act of speech, fictional
assertion.
Establishing the status of a sentence in a literary work does not seem to
be an indifferent issue, not only for the development of the philosophy
of language but predominantly for the theory of a literary work. It re-
sults from the necessity of defining a specific relation between a sentence
used in a function of creating fictional reality, false accordingly to the
assumptions of classic logic, and a cognitive function that undoubtedly
plenty of literary works fulfil. Here comes the question, how come that
a sentence with a theoretically no cognitive value is still capable of con-
veying the knowledge about the world? This apparent contradiction
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is attempted to be explained in various ways — starting from taking
away from a literary work any of the cognitive values, recognising its
straightforwardness [Margolis 1965], up to the conception assuming that
every coherent and artistically successful literary work fulfils a cognitive
and ideological function [Rosner 1970]. The status of a literary sentence
itself is defined in various ways — it is said to be a false sentence [Pelc
1960, 97–128, 399–402], quasi-judgment [Ingarden 1960, 229–244], or
it is assumed as the heterogenic status of the utterance in a literary
work that recognises statements as false or true depending on the type
of the subject in the statement and empiric verifiability of its content
[Markiewicz 1976, 118–147]. John Searle’s conception, formulated years
ago, is remarkable, however, not only as the next voice in a discussion
about a literary statement. Constituting an attempt of incorporation of
John Austin’s theses to the theory of a literary work becomes one of the
programmatic texts of the discipline in literary research which is not new
in fact, but still unappreciated in Poland [Ohmann 1971, 1–19; Ohmann
1973, 81–107; Beardsley 1973, 23–39; Levin 1976, 141–160]. Although it
is not what makes the main goal of the study in this article, it is Searle
who also offers comprehension of the issue of literary reference and the
essence of the literary work as definite type of artefact or its position
towards another kind of literature and culture products.
1. Main theses of John Searle – The Logical Status
of Fictional Discourse
1.1. From the doctrine of etiolations of language by John L. Austin
to the theory of literature as an act of speech
The reconstruction of John Searle’s conception should be preceded by
the answer to a question, what determines the speaking about a literary
work within the theory of speech acts, as the statement that it simply
results from the presence of some speech acts in a text of a literary work,
what is obvious anyway, does not explain the assumed by the philoso-
pher methodological assumptions and the conception of the description
[Searle 1975, 319–332]. Although John L. Austin was not involved in a
literary work itself, in a way he started a discussion about the logical
status of fictional discourse, formulating the doctrine of etiolations of
language. Its presence in the philosopher’s theory seems to be a natu-
“Lying, poets tell the truth . . . ” 319
ral consequence of dividing the statements into two subsets: non-literal
statements and the statements which are particularly deviant, thus non-
serious. The concept of etiolating is used by the researcher in a few
situations — when he analyses the problem of adversity of the speech act
(he excludes, among others, a poem), when he deliberates the matter of
an locutionary act (then he defines phenomenon such as acting, literary
fiction or declamation as non full act) and when he introduces the term
of parasitic speaking, other words not particularly normal (it includes,
among others, poems and jokes). This kind of assertion is characterised
by splitting the sender and the receiver (I included in the statement
differs from I which stands for the real author of the statement, whereas
you which is indicated by virtue of the statement meaning differs from
you who it is in fact directed to) and another kind of reference [Austin
1986, Tomasik 1990, 115–144]. The author of thesis How To Do Things
With Words noticed characteristic suspense of the reference in muttering,
repeating someone’s remarks, uttering sentences in a foreign language,
acting, declamation, quoting and a literary work. These are the locu-
tionary acts, which show a potential object reference. A literary work
— which is obviously an element of sets that are influenced by etiolating
— ought to be shortly defined as the text with a fictional reference and
fictional instances of sending and receiving [Austin 1986].
1.2. Fiction vs. Literature [Searle 1975, 319-320]
Thus, John Searle develops Austin’s thought providing the means of
expressing a literary work (based on the assumptions of his theory) as a
special kind of language creation, in which the speech acts are present,
but they have an essentially different character and they fulfil a different
function although the meaning of the words in the text of a literary work
is the same as in colloquial speech acts.
Continuing Austin’s deliberations, Searle pays attention to the fact
that the concept of fiction is far more reaching than the concept of lit-
erature; what is more, identifying fiction with literature is a mistake, as
not every work that is defined as literary is a fictional assertion. Due
to the fact that literature is a family of meanings, the philosopher is
willing to do the research on fiction not the literary work itself. His
text contains no qualities that would make it a fictional assertion and
it is the author who decides what its character is, similarly to a reader
who decides whether to consider it as a literary assertion. There are not
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any distinct borders between what is literary and what is non-literary.
A fictional assertion is not the same what a figurative assertion; some
definite stylistic elements can be found as well in a colloquial speech
act as in the work of fiction. Another Searle’s distinction concerns the
definition of metaphorical use of expressions as non-literal and fictional
as non-serious.
1.3. Fictional Text as the Set of Pretended –
Untrue Illocution [Searle 1975, 323-326]
While defining semantic and pragmatic conditions that assertion fulfils
as a special illocutionary act, Searle stresses that in fictional discourse we
also identify assertions, but they actually lack the author’s commitment
to truthfulness. The author of fictional discourse does not perform at
the same time a special illocutionary act of telling a story or writing a
novel; accepting such a solution would lead to the thesis that fictional
discourse controls completely different meanings of words and thus, as
a consequence, it would be incomprehensible for the reader. In Searle’s
opinion, the author of a work of fiction pretends to perform a series of
standard illocutionary acts, without the intention of misleading anyone.
There are not any features of the text that would allow to consider it as
fictional and that is why this is the illocutionary attitude of the author to-
ward the discourse that makes the discourse fictional. The possibility of
fiction is established by the set of extra-linguistic horizontal conventions
that break the vertical rules which establish connections of illocutionary
acts in paralinguistic reality. What is more, fictional discourse ought not
to be considered analogically as a lie and this what makes it different is
the existence of another type of convention where untrue assertion can be
performed without the intention of misleading. Pretending to perform
illocutionary acts depends on the actual performance of acts of assertion
(in Austin’s terminology — in the actual performance of phonetic and
phatic) with the intention of applying horizontal conventions thanks to
which normal commitment to the assertion is repealed.
1.4. The Act of Reference vs. Ontology of Objects
Presented in Fiction [Searle 1975, 329-332]
The author of work of fiction by pretending that he performs the act
of reference, he pretends the object exists. A pretended object refer-
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ence is the condition to create a fictional character, as it happens in
the text of a literary work. The effective acts of reference toward a
fictional character can be performed by being outside the statement,
for instance, formulating conclusions after reading. In Searle’s opinion,
within the fictional discourse, there are also genuine acts of reference
what is followed by genuine illocutionary acts. Thus, if the author gives
genuine information, for example, concerning topography of a city or
makes general judgements about reality, he performs this way fortunate
illocutionary act. Moreover, each genre of fiction can be distinguished by
studying their nonfictional commitment to representing facts in objective
reality. And this way, in a realistic novel, the author will undoubtedly
present facts as well; however, in a science fiction novel, this kind of
genuine assertion might not be found at all. The criterion of coherence
becomes the most important and decides about the acceptability of the
ontology. The presence of statements which are neither fictional nor a
part of the novel, such as an initial sentence in Anna Karenina, leads
Searle to a conclusion that a work of fiction, in general, does not consist
only of fictional discourse. The result of the philosopher’s theses should
be accepted as some kind of ontological duality of the world created in
a literary work: it would consist of genuine objects, strictly fictional,
constituting the author’s creation only.
2. The Assessment of Searle’s Theses
2.1. The Problematic Status of a Literary Sentence
as Pretended Illocution
Wojciech Tomasik in his article Od “etiolacji” do “ideologii szczerości”
questions the possibility of demarcation between pretended and non-
pretended illocutions in the text of a literary work, giving attention to
the fact that it can cause perlocutionary effects in the order of reality
[Tomasik 1990, 115–144]. Accordingly, it is very difficult to establish the
connection between pretended illocution and genuine perlocution. Gen-
uine illocutions, although the criterion of distinguishing is not clearly
defined by Searle, would be able to fulfil a cognitive function; however,
a literary work itself, which contains a heterogenic text with regard to
acts of speech which create it, could not comprehensively communicate
cognitive contents in such a way. Thus, cognition received from the sub-
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stantiation of a literary work would constitute the set of unrelated and
incoherent fragmentary perlocutions. This method of understanding the
status of the text in a literary work designs a virtual reader, being able
to distinguish the pretended and nonpretended illocutions, who would
change the cognitive attitude toward the literary work — formulating
them as fictional on one occasion, therefore cognitively valueless, and on
the other occasion as functioning in an analogical to colloquial acts of
speech way, therefore capable of causing definite effects in the order of
life. Such an attitude seems to be inconsistent with reader’s colloquial
substantiating experience, who rather formulates a literary work in a
comprehensive way, and with regard to the indicators of fiction sanc-
tioned by culture (such as a title or a form) focuses more on the reception
of the text aesthetically not cognitively. Regarding the vague criterion of
distinguishing pretended and nonpretended illocutions within a work of
fiction and also the possibility of their pragmatic and logical assessment
from different perspectives (pretended illocution from a reader’s point of
view does not have to be automatically abode by the reader as pretended
and the other way round) and also defining what the text means within
the reality, seems completely impossible.
2.2. The Problematic Status of Literary Reference
The Searle’s solution to the problem of the literary reference seems to
be unsatisfying as the way of explicating its definition has been based
on vague and problematic demarcation between pretended and nonpre-
tended illocutions within the work of fiction. The difference between
the act of literary reference and the act of reference in the order of life
depends, according to the philosopher, on different ontological status of
the objects of reference. Accepting one of the strict rule of reference,
the axiom of existence, the act of literary reference ought to be assumed
as completely unsuccessful [Searle 1969]. It is worth noticing the fact
that even in colloquial acts of speech we refer quite effectively to what
does not exist, for example, to dwarfs or other legendary, fantastic or
mythical characters. Moreover, the text of a literary work does not
contain any indicators, which would allow to distinguish pretended and
nonpretended acts of reference. An average reader is not able to answer
a question when indeed the author performs the act of reference and
when he only pretends such an act. The examples given by Searle are
problematic to such an extent that using the authentic personal name
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or a name of a place does not decide about authenticity of the reference;
it is quite easy to find such a literary work with a denotation of such a
proper name that is not genuine in accordance with objective status of
things in the extraliterary reality. Taking into consideration the fact that
what the pretended reference would be from a reader’s point of view, it
would not necessary have this character for the reader. As a result, the
term of literary reference vanishes and the way of how a literary work
refers to reality is not defined so as to guarantee the development of
coherent conception of cognitive function in a literary work.
In fact, the philosopher uses the term of ontology but his deliberation
lacks the initial comments on the status of existence of name denotations
of that appear in pretended illocutionary acts. There is no suggestion
as to understanding presented objects; from philosophical point of view
doubtful seems to accept that objects created in a literary work can be
as well clearly fictional as real. It is difficult to talk accurately about
the reality of literary objects if the presented world which is created in
a literary work is basically different from objective reality. The object,
which Searle would define as real, takes part in fictional presented world
getting in different functional and semantic connections with remaining,
strictly fictional, objects. Even without doing appropriate ontological
research, we can assume that considering such a way of existence with
any elements of false presented world leads to unsolvable contradictions
even on the ground of non-classic ontology [Stróżewski 2004].
2.3. Vague Definition of a Literary Work
Determining one certain and empirically adequate definition of a literary
work seems to be pointless due to obvious historical changeability of the
term of a literary work which is always adjusted to a present culture
situation. However, it does not mean that we are not able to give some
categorical indicators of a literary work. Searle, as well as other repre-
sentatives of the theory of literature as an act of speech, treats a literary
work in an analogical way toward other assertions touched by etiolating
what in consequence leads to revoking particular values. Even if we
do not expect the solution to the problem of literary indicators, it is
worth mentioning that although — as Searle rightly claims — there is
no even one factor in the text that would indicate its unreality, there are
culturally sanctioned indicators of unreality which cause that we read a
text in a aesthetical way; we are focused on getting along with false world
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not the real one — a literary form, title and even a place of presence
in the text — thus, it can design the reading of an aware participant of
the culture. It is worth pondering, even though it is a difficult venture,
whether fiction which determines a literary assertion does not have a
different character from fiction which concerns jokes or other etiolating
assertions. A linguistic research will not give a satisfying answer; it is
necessary to start deliberations, which will probably become an essential
starting point; however, they basically ought to be concentrated on on-
tological status of objects presented in a literary work [Paśniczek 1984,
1988, 1994, Parsons 1975, 73–86, Cyzman 2003, 57–119].
3. Without a Solution. Final Conclusions
John Searle’s proposition seems to be even these days cognitively attrac-
tive enough to show dynamic aspect of the text of a literary work stress-
ing its essential otherness from colloquial acts of speech. The conception
of the logical status of fictional discourse is questionable and at the same
time proves the limited possibilities of using a strictly linguistic theory in
a theory of literature. If the theory of speech acts has not worked out the
concept of a text, proving itself among single acts of speech, undoubtedly
it cannot be used for explaining the text of a literary work [Wierzbicka
1983, 125–137; Tomasik 1988, 125–140]. Searle’s deliberations, as well
as establishments of most remarkable researchers who are engaged in a
problem of the literary status of a statement, should consider creative
power of the text as a base of literary work which is followed by a par-
ticular modus of referention in a text of fiction [Cyzman 2003, 57–119].
Maybe Katarzyna Rosner’s solution, who studied the way a literary work
fulfils a cognitive function on the basis of presented world implied as the
symbolic system, appropriately completed by ontological research would
give a fuller picture of an interesting phenomenon [Rosner 1970].
Searle formulates only a proposition of a solution to an old semantic
problem which relatively encourages to further fundamental questions.
It seems that Austin’s theory of speech acts does not give possibilities of
its fuller deception. Searle himself ends his article with a statement that
so far, there has been no general theory which explains the mechanism
due to which pretended illocutions convey illocutionary intentions [Searle
1975, 332]. Thus, the solution to this interesting issue is still waiting for
its courageous (naïve?) discoverer.
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